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Abstract
According to conventional macroeconomics, public debt has a significant effect on the
economy since consumers see public debt as net wealth, however, according to the
Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis, that effect would be absent. This paper’s results,
obtained from Euler equation estimations, using a panel data approach, indicate that it
would be wise to reject the debt neutrality hypothesis for the EU-15. However,
estimations carried out after dividing the countries into two groups, tentatively allow us
to conclude that private consumption in "less indebted" countries seems to be more
responsive to wealth increases than in the "more indebted" countries.
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1. Introduction
Government debt neutrality and the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis have been one of
the most debated issues of modern macroeconomics, and the subject of a large number
of theoretical and empirical research papers. Under conventional macroeconomic
analysis, public debt has an effect on the economy since consumers consider public debt
as net wealth.1 Therefore, the bigger the stock of public debt the wealthier consumers
feel and the more inclined they are to consume.
The terms “Ricardian Equivalence Theorem” or “Ricardian Equivalence Proposition”
are nowadays included in the vocabulary of macroeconomics being the expression
Ricardian Equivalence apparently coined by Buchanan (1976).2 While the first formal
exposition is credited to Barro (1974), in a seminal paper, the theoretical rational behind
the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis was originally stated by Ricardo (1817, 1820).3
Even if Barro does not initially refer Ricardo, he ends up acknowledging Ricardo’s
merit in his reply to Buchanan’s (1976) comment.4
This paper adds to the existing literature, by using panel data methodology in testing the
debt neutrality hypothesis, which so far was basically tested using time-series methods.
As far as the author knows, this is also the first investigation, concerning debt neutrality,
aiming exclusively at the EU countries.
The paper is organised as follows: in section two, Barro’s result for debt neutrality is
briefly discussed; section three derives the Euler equation set up, resulting from the
consumer’s inter-temporal optimisation problem; section four presents the empirical
results for the EU-15, and offers some comments; section five is a conclusion.
                                               
1 See for instance Blinder and Solow (1973) and Christ (1978).
2 Feldstein (1982) prefers the term pre-Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis or proposition. Buiter and
Tobin (1979) use the expression neo-Ricardian Equivalence.
3 Barro (1998, pp. 47) guesses that his 1974 article has probably been quoted more that 840 times.
4 “Buchanan begins his comment by pointing my failure to acknowledge an intellectual debt to
David Ricardo. I readily accept his criticism (...)”, Barro (1976, p. 346). Later on, Barro (1998) says:
" My excuse for being blissfully ignorant in 1973 of Ricardo' s contribution is that I was a young,
non-tenured faculty member with inadequate graduate training from Harvard University."
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2. Government debt neutrality
Barro’s (1974) paper definitely set a landmark and represented a turning point of the
literature concerning the public debt issue. The necessary conditions for the Ricardian
Equivalence to hold are clearly presented on that paper, namely the intergenerational
solidarity model, with a theoretical set up inspired in the overlapping generations model
of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965).5 Definitely, the link between generations is
paramount to guarantee the debt neutrality result.
In a simplified way, the main idea of the debt neutrality proposition dwells on the
supposition that public debt and lump sum taxes are equivalent methods of financing a
given amount of public expenses. Deficits merely postpone the future imposition of
taxes. If consumers are rational, it becomes indifferent to pay 100 Euros of taxes today
or tomorrow. In that sense, being irrelevant to the consumers the moment when taxes
are paid, consumers do not change their consumption decisions after variations in the
budget deficit. Therefore, one of the several implications of the theorem’s validity is the
result of debt neutrality, when the deficit is financed by public debt, that is, deficits do
not influence real variables, and have no effects on aggregate demand. For instance,
Phelps (1982, pp. 379) considers that increases in the supply of public debt ends up
creating its own demand, and it would not influence the demand for other assets. In
other words, there would be a sort of  “Say’s Law” for the deficits and its financing by
public debt.
Nevertheless, one must recognize that Ricardo was convinced that in practice it was
quite relevant the method the government chooses to finance its expenses. This
conviction of Ricardo led O’Driscoll (1977) to suggest that the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem should be called “Ricardian Nonequivalence Theorem.”6
                                               
5 As Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) put it, “Barro can be viewed as the Christopher Columbus of
Ricardian Equivalence (…) Barro was not the first economist to discover Ricardian Equivalence, but
he was surely the last (…) and no one will be able to discover it again.”
6 Barro (1979, p. 940) labels O’ Driscoll (1977) comments as “an amusing discussion of whether
Ricardo actually held to the Ricardian view.”
4
Usually, the critics to the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis focus on distortionary
taxation, and intergenerational altruism and capital markets efficiency.7 For instance,
Sims (1998) states in a vigorous way that the Ricardian Equivalence theorem is
irrelevant for the reality economists try to understand and formalise, while Buiter (1985)
holds that “neutrality of public debt and deficits is little more than a theoretical
curiosum.” It should therefore be considered as an extreme situation since taxes are not
lump-sum, some prices are not perfectly flexible, people do not live forever and many
people do not have ascendants or descendants willing to help them financially.
The altruistic behaviour is also open to much criticism and discussion. The absence of
intergenerational transfers may for instance be the result of divergent preferences
among household members.8 Also, the opposition between finite horizons and infinite
horizons, for the validation of altruism, may not be that important when one considers
budget deficits short run effects. Notice, for instance, that if public debt has an average
maturity of 10 or 15 years, then there is a high probability that present generations will
be called upon to finance debt redemption, through the imposition of future taxes, even
if there is a certain amount of Ponzi games.
It is quite unlikely that capital markets are efficient or that households do not face
liquidity constraints. One of the reasons for capital markets imperfections is the
existence of credit rationing, eventually due to adverse selection or asymmetric
information problems.9 Adverse selection in the capital markets, specifically in the
credit market, is usually the main obstacle against the possibility of accepting Ricardian
Equivalence. One may say that when a considerable part of consumers is liquidity
constrained, favourable evidence for supporting Ricardian Equivalence should be quite
                                               
7 Discussions of the necessary conditions for Ricardian Equivalence to hold, may be found namely in
Brennan and Buchanan (1986), Bernheim (1987, 1989), Aschauer (1988) and Seater (1993).
8 On this topic see Carmichael (1982) and Becker (1974). Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) present several
versions of possible altruistic models.
9 Afonso and Teixeira (1999) present results of inefficiency on the formation of price quotes in the
public debt market for the Euro area. For credit rationing and asymmetric information see, for
instance, Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1991). Afonso and St. Aubyn (1999)
present some empirical results for credit rationing in Portugal.
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feeble. As a matter of fact, in such a setting, many consumers will be led to eventually
consume their entire income.10
3. Government debt neutrality and private consumption
According to conventional macroeconomic theory, deficits affect negatively private
investment. In a closed economy, a deficit increase, financed in the market, would raise
interest rates since the government is competing with the private sector for the available
savings in the economy and that might also cause more inflation. Increasing interest
rates would then have a negative stimulus on private investment.11 In an open economy,
with capital mobility, the interest rate increase would appreciate the national currency
and increase foreign demand by assets denominated in national currency. On the other
hand, currency appreciation is bound to deteriorate the current account.
The key idea behind Ricardian Equivalence is that consumers are linked by
intergenerational altruism, and also that they have a fairly good perception about the
future taxes needed to repay the present increase in public debt. Consumer’s net wealth
would be invariant between more debt today and more taxes tomorrow. By this
reasoning, budget deficits would have no real effects and fiscal policy would be unable
to change consumption, quite a different notion from the one sustained by Keynes. In a
limit situation, as Gramlich (1989) noted, when the government reduces taxes,
consumers just save more, for instance placing money in time deposit accounts, in order
to help pay the higher future taxes, and consumption remains unchanged.
Empirical validation of the neutrality hypothesis, through the consumption function,
may generically be divided into two categories: tests using reaction functions inspired in
the Permanent Income/Life Cycle hypothesis and Euler equation tests resulting from the
consumer’s inter-temporal optimisation problem, the approach used on this paper. The
direct use of Euler equations derived from the intertemporal consumer’s maximisation
                                               
10 Cushing (1992) and Rockerbie (1997) present results for the US that seem to indicate that about
40 per cent of the consumers are liquidity constrained. Leiderman and Razin (1988) develop and test
a model where part of the consumers also face liquidity constraints in the capital markets.
11 Santos (1992) and Afonso (1995) present some results concerning the inflationary effects of
budget deficits for Portugal and for the European Community countries. References for the effects of
deficits on interest rates are namely Eisner (1989) and Rose and Hakes (1995).
6
problem in this framework, follows the initial work of Hall (1978), and is adopted by
Aschauer (1985), Dalamagas (1992) and Gupta (1992). By using the first order
condition for the representative consumer it is possible to skip the problems surrounding
the specification of consumer functions based on the Permanent Income/Life Cycle
hypothesis.
Suppose the following expression for the aggregate consumption function, as the sum of
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where C is aggregate consumption in period; At-1 is the stock of assets at the end of t-1,
that is, non-human wealth, including government debt held by the public; ρ is the real
rate of return (assumed constant); Yt  is the after tax labour income (human wealth); α  is
the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth; Et is the expectation operator,
conditional to the information known by consumers at period t and µ is the discount rate
used by consumers to discount future labour income.
If µ = ρ, then consumers act as if they lived forever, that is, they take into consideration
the consumption decisions of future generations. In a nutshell, if µ = ρ, consumers are
Ricardian. The bigger the µ, the bigger the myopia effect in present generations when
considering future taxes, and if that were the case we would be in a situation of almost
complete absence of Ricardian Equivalence.
With finite horizons, consumers may discount future income at a discount rate higher
than the interest rate they receive from their holdings of non-human wealth. When
µ > ρ, consumers are expecting to receive the total actual value of interests on public
debt (included in the stock of assets) but they think they are going to pay only a fraction
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of future taxes. In other words, consumers are indeed assuming a discount rate for
human wealth higher than the real interest rate.12
In order to reach a testable model from expression (1), this equation is going to be
lagged one period, multiplied by (1+µ) and the result subtracted from (1). The final
result is given by
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Assuming that available aggregate income may be either consumed or accumulated in
assets,
11 −− −+=+ tttttt AACAY ρ  (4)
the economy’s budget constraint is then given by
tttt CYAA −++= −1)1( ρ . (5)
Using equation (2) and (5) to eliminate human wealth from (10), the aggregate
consumption function may be written as13
tttt uACC +−+−+= −− 11 )()1)(1( µρααµ (6)
                                               
12 Notice that for instance Evans (1988, pp. 985-986), one of the first authors to use this approach,
uses a slightly different notation from the one used in this paper. The term (1+µ) in this paper is
equivalent to the term (1−µ)/(1+ρ) on Evans paper. In Evans notation µ is the fraction of population
that dies each period and, when µ = 0, consumers are Ricardian, they have infinite horizons, and
when µ > 0, consumers have finite horizons. Evans (1993) interprets this fraction (probability) as a
measure of the intensity of the existing links between actual consumers and futures generations.
13 This procedure is similar to the one followed by Evans (1988). Hayashi (1982) chooses to
eliminate neither non-human wealth nor human wealth (see Himarios (1995)).
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and the testable model is then
tttt uACC +++= −− 11 θδβ , (7)
where β is a constant, δ = (1+µ)(1−α), and θ = α(ρ−µ). With equation (7) it is then
possible to test if consumers are Ricardian. Specifically, the null hypothesis of
Ricardian Equivalence is θ  = 0 (ρ=µ). Under the alternative hypothesis, when
consumers do not have a Ricardian behaviour )( ρµ ≠ , then the coefficient θ might
be significantly different from zero. As explained above, this might imply that
consumers behave as having finite horizons and government bonds are seen as net
wealth.
4. Empirical tests for the EU: results and comments
After the 1st of January 1999 several European currencies gave way to the Euro. Eleven
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) successfully met the convergence criteria underlined
in the Maastricht Treaty and, according to the decisions of the European Council of
May 1998, those countries were the founders of Economic and Monetary Union. Four
other countries of the European Union remained outside the Euro either, because they
wanted, United Kingdom and Denmark, or because they did not fulfil the convergence
criteria, Greece and Sweden. At the beginning of 2001, Greece also joined the Euro.
For the empirical implementation of equation (7) several measures of wealth are
conceivable. Public debt held by the public is sometimes included along with for
instance monetary base, time deposits or demand deposits. The results presented by
several authors concerning government debt neutrality validation, through aggregate
consumption functions, are quite divergent. This divergence of results led Barro (1989,
p. 49) to consider that “basically, the results are all over the map, with some favouring
Ricardian equivalence, and others not.” Some examples of previous empirical work are
provided by Evans (1993), who does not reject the neutrality hypothesis for the OECD
countries, while Khalid (1996) and Lopez et al. (2000) reject the neutrality hypothesis
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respectively for developing countries and for a set of both developing and OECD
countries.
In this paper, to estimate equation (7), data for private consumption and government
debt is used, with this last variable being a proxy for wealth. This option was chosen
since it was impossible to get data for the monetary aggregates for every UE country,
from a single source, in order to guarantee data comparability.14 All variables are in real
terms, in 1990 prices, and expressed in Euros (data sources are describe in the Annex).
The strategy followed in this paper starts with dividing the countries into two groups,
according to the indebtedness level. The debt-to-GDP ratio is used to classify the
countries either as a “less indebted” country, when the debt-to-GDP ratio is below 60
per cent, or as a “more indebted” country, when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above 60 per
cent. This approach allows the construction of an artificial variable, D1, which is equal
to 1 for the “less indebted” countries, and assumes the value 0 for the countries
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The reason for choosing initially the 60 per cent threshold is simply because this
became an important limit for the debt-to-GDP ratio after the Maastricht Treaty.
However, this limit will be allowed to change in the subsequent empirical work.
As a first working hypothesis, the debt-to-GDP ratio was computed for each country, as
an average for the period 1970-2000. Those average ratios, the exact time span for each
country and the binary values assigned to the artificial variable D1, are identified in
Table 1 (Luxembourg was excluded due to data problems).
                                               
14 The only institution that could supply consistent and homogeneous data for the monetary
aggregates, for each of the EU countries, is the European Central Bank. Unfortunately, the ECB did
not provide us with that information. An alternative hypothesis, tested by Afonso (1999), would be
to use data from the International Monetary Fund. However, this means to reduce the time sample,
with sometimes information available only until 1997, besides the fact that the same monetary
aggregates are not always available for every country.
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Table 1 – “Less indebted” and “more indebted” countries
Country
Debt-to-GDP ratio
(%), average for the
period
D1 Period Nº of
observations
Austria 45,0 1 1970-2000 31
Belgium 101,1 0 1970-2000 31
Denmark 47,1 1 1971-2000 30
Finland 24,0 1 1970-2000 31
France 38,0 1 1977-2000 24
Germany 39,2 1 1970-2000 31
Greece 61,8 0 1970-2000 31
Ireland 77,5 0 1970-2000 31
Italy 82,4 0 1970-2000 31
Netherlands 63,7 0 1975-2000 26
Portugal 51,2 1 1975-2000 26
Spain 36,2 1 1973-2000 28
Sweden 50,1 1 1970-2000 31
United Kingdom 54,3 1 1970-2000 31
“Less indebted” 42,8 263
“More indebted” 77,3 150
All countries 55,1 413
The complete panel data sample includes 413 observations, divided into the two groups:
“less indebted” countries, 263 observations and “more indebted” countries, 150
observations.
For the entire data sample, using panel data methodology, an equation inspired on
equation (7) was estimated,
itiititit uDACC ++++= −− 111 γθδβ , (9)
where the index i denotes the country and the index t stands for the period. Table 2
presents the results of the estimation of equation (9).
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Table 2 – Estimation of equation (9), pooled regression, dummy variable computed
as the period average for each country
Variable
(coefficient)




















The t statistics are in parenthesis. The DW statistics are computed according to Bhargava,
Franzini e Narendanathan (1982), using TSP, version 4.4, 1997.
The estimation results do not discard the possibility of D1 being statistically different
from zero. In other words, it is not possible to reject the idea that there are differences
between consumers’ decisions in the “less indebted” and in the “more indebted”
countries, after changes in wealth (here proxied only by government debt). Still another
result to notice is that for the entire panel data sample, an increase in wealth has a
positive effect on private consumption.
Subsequently, a different approach was tried, with the values for the artificial variable
D1 being obtained on a year-by-year basis, for each country, according to the debt-to-
GDP ratio observed in each year. This adjustment is important since several countries
changed considerably their level of indebtedness during the period considered in this
paper.
The relevance of considering the existence of differences between the several countries
is also taken into account. This is done by assuming that the autonomous term changes
from country to country, in each cross-section sample, in order to capture those
individual country characteristics. Another version of the previous model is now given
by the following equation,
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ititititiit uDACC ++++= −− 111 γθδβ , (10)
where βi stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i.
The fixed effects model is a typical choice for macroeconomists, and may eventually be
more adequate than the random effects model. For instance, if the individual effects are
somehow a substitute for non-specified variables, it is probable that each country
specific effects are correlated with the other independent variables. In addition, and
since the country sample includes all the relevant countries, the EU countries, it is less
obvious that one might want to consider this set of countries as a random sample of a
larger universe of countries.
In other words, and as reminded by Greene (1997) and Judson and Owen (1997), when
the individual observations sample (countries in our case) comes from a larger
population (which could be all the countries in the world), it would be suitable to
consider the specific constant terms as randomly distributed through the cross section
units. However, and even if the present country sample includes a small number of
countries, it is sensible to admit that the EU-15 countries have similar specific
characteristics, not shared by the other countries in the world. In this case, it would
seem adequate to choose the fixed effects formalization, even if it is not correct to
generalize the results afterwards, to the entire population, which is not the purpose of
the paper.
The estimation results of equation (10), presented in Table 3, are generally similar to the
ones obtained when the dummy variable D1 was computed as the period debt-to-GDP
ratio average, for each country.
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Table 3 – Estimation of equation (10), dummy variable computed for each year




































2R 0,9928 0,9968 0,994 0,9975




DW 0,955 0,907 1,218 1,166
The t statistics are in parentheses.
a - The degrees of freedman for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for
all countries, which is the null hypothesis.
* - Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, the null hypothesis, of the pooled regression
model, is rejected
The possibility of the fixed effects model being more adequate seems to get statistical
validation as one may confirm by the value of the F statistic. This is a test of the null
hypothesis that all effects are the same for each country, in other words, the hypothesis
that all autonomous terms βi for equation (10) are identical.15 However, with D1
entering equation (10) in an additive form, the statistical significance of this variable is
rather low in the fixed effects model.
Still another alternative model was estimated, which includes the variable D1 in a
multiplicative form in the private consumption equation, according to the following
specification
                                               
15 The F statistic is computed as F (n-1, nT-n-k)=[(Ru
2-Rp
2)/(1- Ru
2)][(nT-n-k)/(n-1)], where u stands
for the model without restrictions, p denotes the pooled regression, that is the model with the
restriction that there is only one autonomous term, n is the number of countries, T is the number of
periods and k is the number of exogenous variables (see for instance, Greene (1997) and Johnston
and DiNardo (1997)).
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ititititiit uADACC +×+++= −−− 111 )1(ψθδβ , (11)
and the testable hypothesis implies to evaluate if ψ>0.
When public indebtedness is seen by the consumers as moderate (D1=1), changes in
government debt would have a more significant effect on private consumption
decisions, with that effect being given by [θ+ψ]. If government indebtedness is higher
(D1=0), changes in public debt may have a more mitigated effect on private
consumption, that is, consumers might become more Ricardian. Table 4 presents the
estimation results for equation (11).

































2R 0,9930 0,9946 0,9930
F a test 8,12*
(13,382)
Hausman b test 14.799 **
(3)
DW 1,034 1,244 0,943
The t statistics are in parentheses.
a - The degrees of freedman for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for
all countries, which is the null hypothesis.
b - The statistic has a Chi-square distribution (the degrees of freedom are in parentheses); the
Hausman (1978) statistic tests the fixed effects model against the random effects, which is here
the null hypothesis.
* - Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, the null hypothesis of the pooled regression
model is rejected.
** - Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, the null hypothesis is rejected (random
effects model), that is, one rejects the hypothesis that the autonomous terms in each country are
not correlated with the independent explanatory variables (in this case the random effects model
does not produce unbiased and consistent estimators).
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Some comments can be made to those results. For instance, an increase of government
debt of say 1000 Euros may have the effect of raising private consumption by 44 Euros
(44=29+15, according to the fixed effects model), if government indebtedness is not too
high (D1=1). This effect may amount to only 29 Euros when consumers, due to a more
significant debt-to-GDP ratio (D1=0), assume a partially Ricardian behaviour. In this
case, consumers perceive the increase of government debt, less as an increase of wealth
and more as a sign of future tax increases.
Table 4 reports also the results for the random effects model. The feasibility of the
random effects model is assessed by the Hausman statistic, which tests the null
hypothesis that the random effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. In
our case, and taking into account the fact that the test statistic is significant at the 1 per
cent level, the random effects model hypothesis is rejected, in favour of the fixed effects
model.
Given that it is not possible to reject immediately the hypothesis of the existence of
different consumer’s behaviour, among countries with high and moderate government
indebtedness, equation (10) was once more estimated, now separately for the two
groups of countries identified earlier in Table 1: “less indebted” countries (Germany,
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom) and “more indebted” countries (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Netherlands). With this approach, it is possible to further test the hypothesis that the
government debt coefficient, θ, is positive and statistically significant for the “less
indebted” countries and null for the “more indebted” countries. Once again, the rational
for this set up implies that with a lower debt-to GDP ratio, government debt is partially
seen as wealth. Faced with a higher debt-to GDP ratio (above 60 per cent in our case),
consumers are more Ricardian, government debt is not perceived as wealth, and it
should be possible to accept the hypothesis θ = 0. Table 5 presents the results of the
estimations for the model discussed above.
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2R 0,9925 0,9938 0,9924
F a test 7,60*
(8,243)
Hausman b test 10.978 **
(2)



























2R 0,9952 0,9953 0,9952
F a test      2,119*
(4,138)
Hausman b test 4.645 **
(2)
DW 1,217 1,217 0,943
The t statistics are in parentheses.
a - The degrees of freedman for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for
all countries, which is the null hypothesis.
b - The statistic has a Chi-square distribution (the degrees of freedom are in parentheses); the
Hausman (1978) statistic tests the fixed effects model against the random effects, which is here
the null hypothesis.
* - Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, the null hypothesis of the pooled regression
model is rejected.
** - Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, the null hypothesis is rejected (random
effects model), that is, one rejects the hypothesis that the autonomous terms in each country are
not correlated with the independent explanatory variables (in this case the random effects model
does not produce unbiased and consistent estimators), for the “more indebted” countries only at
the 10 per cent level.
17
It is now possible to see that government debt seems more important to explain private
consumption decisions in the “less indebted” countries, than in the “more indebted”
countries. In fact, in the “less indebted” countries the government debt coefficient is
positive and statistically different form zero, while for the group of “more indebted”
countries, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of that coefficient being different
from zero in the private consumption function.
Therefore, in the case of the “less indebted” countries, and using the fixed effects model
results, an increase of government debt of for instance 1000 Euros may have the effect
of raising private consumption by 44 Euros, a result similar to the one previously found
when estimating equation (11) for the entire country sample. One may then tentatively
say that these results indicate somehow that private consumption in “less indebted”
countries reacts more to government debt increases than consumption in “more
indebted” countries.16 In other words, consumers would be less Ricardian in “less
indebted” countries.
Since the 60 per cent limit for the debt-to-GDP ratio lacks a clear-cut economic
rationalization, equations (10) e (11) where also estimated using as an alternative for the
debt-to-GDP ratio, the 50 and the 70 per cent thresholds. The dummy variable D1 is
once again computed for each country, in each year. The results of this new set of
estimations are presented in Table 6.
                                               
16 For instance (1992), with a different modelling of the one used in this paper, concludes, for a
sample of 52 countries, that consumers seem to behave in a more Ricardian fashion in what we label
as “more indebted” countries than in the “less indebted” countries. Nevertheless the author does not
clarify the threshold limits for the variables used to define the country groups.
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Table 6 – Estimation of equations (10) and (11), dummy variable computed for
each year
Using the limit of 50% for the debt-to-GDP ratio
Variable
(coefficient)






























2R 0,9927 0,9933 0,9945 0,995




DW 0,953 1,082 1,222 1,303
Using the limit of 70% for the debt-to-GDP ratio
Variable
(coefficient)






























2R 0,9928 0,9930 0,9943 0,9943




DW 0,952 0,981 1,217 1,217
The t statistics are in parentheses.
a - The degrees of freedom for the F statistic are in parentheses; the statistic tests the fixed
effects model against the pooled regression model, where the autonomous term is the same for
all countries, which is the null hypothesis.
* - Statistically significant, the null hypothesis, of the pooled regression model, is rejected.
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These results can be compared with the ones obtained when the 60 per cent debt-to-
GDP ratio was used (see Tables 3 and 4). Looking at for instance the fixed effects
regression, with the multiplicative dummy variable, one can see that now the results are
statistically more significant. In fact, with the 50 per cent limit, the coefficient (ψ) for
the relevant exogenous variable is now unequivocally significant and positive. Also, the
effect of a change in the stock of government debt, on private consumption, seems to be
more substantial. Indeed, an increase of 1000 Euros has the effect of raising private
consumption by 82 Euros (θ+ψ = 41+41 = 82) if government indebtedness is more
mitigated, or may raise private consumption by 41 Euros when the debt-to-GDP is
larger, and consumers depict in some way more Ricardian features.
Furthermore, when the 70 per cent limit for the debt-to-GDP ratio is used, the results are
not statistically more significant than obtained with booth the 50 and the 60 per cent
limits, even if the coefficients still have the right signs. Estimations were also made,
with the thresholds of 50 and 70 per cent, but computing the D1 variable as the period
average for each country. However, the results, not presented in the paper, did not
improve the statistical quality of the estimated models. One must then also conclude
that it is better to use, for the dummy variable, the values observed in each year for the
debt-to-GDP, in every country.
It looks then as if above the 50 per cent threshold, consumers are somehow more aware
of the future consequences of government indebtedness. In addition, the wealth variable
now becomes more significant than in the specifications where the countries were
labelled as “more” or “less” indebted according to the 60 per cent limit for the debt-to-
GDP ratio. Briefly, with the 50 per cent limit for the debt-to-GDP ratio, one cannot
reject the hypothesis that public debt is relevant to explain private consumption, with
this relation being a positive one.
5 - Conclusions
This paper presented test results for private consumption Euler equation estimates,
which seem to indicate that it would be wise to reject the Ricardian Equivalence
hypothesis for the EU countries, using a panel data sample between 1970-2000. This
paper is also, as far as the author is aware, the first attempt to characterise private
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consumption response to government debt indebtedness, solely using the EU-15
countries. It is therefore implicit in the empirical analysis, the assumption that this set of
countries has somehow certain common features, relating namely consumer’s behaviour
throughout the EU.
Tentatively one could perhaps notice that private consumption is more responsive to
wealth increases in “less indebted” countries than in the “more indebted” countries.
Therefore, if we ask the question, does higher government indebtedness imply a more
Ricardian behaviour from European consumers, a cautious answer would be that there
seems to be some evidence pointing that way.
Also, estimations with different limits for the debt-to-GDP ratio, 50, 60 and 70 per cent,
in order to assess a possible threshold for the change in consumers behaviour, seem to
reveal that the 50 per cent limit provides a clearer consumer behaviour distinction
according to the country indebtedness level.
Our results, for a data set that could in some way be considered as a smaller sample of
the OECD countries, weigh against those of Evans (1993) in some way, since he does
not reject the neutrality hypothesis for the OECD countries, and match up to those of
Lopez et al. (2000) who reject the neutrality hypothesis for the OECD countries. The
present paper uses however a different empirical approach vis-à-vis the cited papers.
Annex: Data sources
Public debt – national currency;
Budget deficit, general government – national currency, market prices;
GDP – national currency, market prices;
Private consumption – national currency, market prices;
Exchange rates – ECU, Euro, versus national currency;
source: European Economy, nº 71, European Commission, 2000.
Consumer Price Index – 1990 = 100,
source: Main Economic Indicators, Historical Statistics, 1960-1996, OECD,
1997, 1998; Main Economic Indicators, January, OECD, 2001.
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